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Some Problems of Foreign Exchange*
By H. G. P. Deans
The subject of foreign exchange has been engrossing the time
and attention of bankers, economists and business men through
out the world for the past two years. In fact, since the signing of
the armistice in November, 1918, the foreign exchange situation
has become one of the most difficult and serious problems that
the business men not only of America but of the whole world have
had to face. Business men, bankers and economists have been
searching for two years for some cure for the disordered condition
of the exchanges and they have not been able to find it. There is
no cure but time and return to normal conditions.
The foreign exchange banker of today has to be a different
man from the foreign exchange banker of ten years ago. Prior
to that time the foreign exchange business of the whole country
was conducted almost exclusively by and through a round half
dozen private banking houses in the city of New York, one or
two of them being partly English and the remainder very much
German. American banks had never taken seriously the question
of the profits to be made in foreign exchange and had been con
tent to transact their business and to see the business of the coun
try transacted through these private banking institutions.
As time passed on the business of the country grew, and word
began to get abroad in banking circles that there were large profits
to be made in the foreign exchange business—profits which had
been overlooked by national and state banks. As a result, it be
came the custom, or the fashion, if you please, for large banks
throughout the country, in the larger cities, at any rate, to organ
ize foreign departments and to open direct accounts with the prin
cipal foreign countries of the world. That practice has grown
now to such an extent that most of the large banks in New York,
Boston, Philadelphia, Cleveland, Chicago, St. Louis and many
cities west of us have foreign exchange departments in which you
* An address delivered at the regional meeting of the American Institute of Account
ants, Chicago, November 19, 1920.
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can buy and sell on practically any banking center throughout the
world.
I am going to avoid statistics as much as possible. Person
ally, I have always had suspicion of statistics. Years ago before
I came to this country I used to be a very assiduous reader of
the Illustrated London News, with which many of you are no
doubt familiar. In those days James Payn, the novelist, used to
conduct a more or less witty column in that paper, and I remem
ber his writing on one occasion something which sank down into
my mind so that I have never forgotten it. He said in answer
to a correspondent: “There are three degrees or classes of lies;
there are lies, damned lies and statistics.”
Therefore, in trying to describe to you some of the problems
and difficulties of the foreign exchange business, I am going to
keep away as far as I can from statistics, which are sometimes
made to mean anything or nothing. I am also going to avoid
speaking at too great length.
Let me say to you first of all that in its simplest form the
functioning of foreign exchange covers all the operations con
nected with the buying and selling of foreign debts—in other
words, with the buying and selling of substitutes for metallic
money.
Foreign exchange is a commodity, just as gold or grain or wool
or corn or wheat is, and it is controlled and governed by the same
laws which govern any other commodity; that is to say, it is sub
ject to the laws of supply and demand. If there are more sellers
of debts than buyers of debts, of course the price of exchange
goes down, that is, the price of debts goes down. If, however,
there are more buyers of debts than sellers of debts, the price of
exchange, other things being equal, goes up.
In his Theory of Banking, McLeod, who is a well known au
thority on the subject, in comparing the foreign exchange with
wheat, says among other things:
“If money is scarce and wheat very abundant, the price of
wheat must fall; but if money is very abundant the price of
wheat will rise. The price of debts or foreign exchange obeys
the same rule. If money becomes very scarce, the price of debts
must fall. If specie becomes abundant, then the price of debts
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will rise. The price of debts then must follow the same great laws
of nature that the price of wheat does.”
At the present time the foreign exchanges are in a deplorable
condition. They are depreciated to an extent that none of us ever
expected to see. There are of course many reasons why they are
depreciated, but chief among these reasons is supply and demand.
As a banker, engaged in the business, I can conservatively say
that there are ninety sellers of exchange for every buyer, if I ex
cept in that statement the large numbers of people who come into
our banks every day to buy small personal remittances as presents
to relatives or for the discharge of trifling obligations on the other
side. There is today, however, no commercial buying of foreign
exchange. Before the war, we owed Europe three or four billion
dollars. Since that time we have paid off the three or four billion
dollars we owed, and we have lent ten billion dollars in addition.
The result is that there is practically no demand for remittances
to Europe at the present time. We owe nothing there; we have
no interest due, no obligations to pay. It is all the other way.
That is one of the chief reasons why exchanges are in their
present condition.
Another and almost as important a reason is the fact that the
United States today is practically the only country in the world
that is still on a gold basis. By that I mean that other countries,
while many of them have plenty of gold, are no longer exporting
gold, and consequently an American creditor can no longer com
mand gold from his foreign debtor.
Most of the European countries—and many of the others for
that matter, although the European countries are the principal
offenders—have so increased and distended their paper issues
that today they have become unwieldy and no longer bear any
relation to the gold reserves of the issuing countries. As a matter
of fact, the paper issues of such countries as Germany and Aus
tria bear absolutely no relation to the gold of those countries.
Before the war it was universally accepted that paper cur
rency should have behind it a substantial gold or silver reserve,
the purpose of such reserve being to enable each country to re
deem its notes promptly on demand. But unfortunately, as the
war ran on, many countries and particularly the enemy countries,
adopted the plan of financing the war through the issue of paper
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money. Germany issued paper money as fast as her printing
presses could turn it out, asserting, whether she believed it or
not, that the indemnities she would subsequently collect from the
allies would redeem that excess paper.
The result has been, however, not only with Germany but with
France, Austria and Italy, as well as most of the smaller European
countries, that their paper issues today are unredeemable. They
have not enough gold to redeem them and are not likely to have
for many a long day to come, Consequently in terms of United
States currency, this country still being on a gold basis, the paper
issues of these various foreign countries are much depreciated
because at present unconvertible.
Britain and the United States are on a better basis. The ex
pansion in our country is trifling compared to that which has
taken place in other countries; and this, of course, is one of the
reasons why today the American dollar is selling at so high a
premium over the currencies of other countries.
Another reason why the foreign exchanges have depreciated
is that five years of destructive warfare have so depleted all
European stocks of raw and manufactured materials that many
countries have little they can now export in exchange for those
things which, even at the present ruinous rates of exchange, they
must have.
During the war and for some time after it our government
continued to make loans to Europe out of the ten billion dollars
which was voted by congress for that purpose. When that ten
billion dollar allocation was exhausted, the loans stopped; and
with the stopping of the loans the exchanges began to fall.
These in a general way are the reasons which are at the bot
tom of the present depreciated state of the exchanges as a whole.
I might perhaps add, however, that in one or two instances there
are also special reasons why the exchanges are as low as they are
today. For example, the French franc is adversely affected by the
extent to which Russia is indebted to France. Russia owes France
a large sum of money. The prospect of collecting it at the present
time is far from good. The French need the money badly, worse
than they ever did before, but the likelihood of being able to get
it for some time is remote.
That is also true in a lesser degree of Great Britain, because
the Russian debt to Great Britain is by no means inconsiderable;
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but it has not had as great an influence on British finances, which
are more stable and extensive than French finances. In addition,
however, to the Russian debt with which England has to contend,
she has other troubles. There are the disturbances in Ireland, for
example. There are the troubles in India, the unrest in Mesopo
tamia and in other parts of the empire which may or may not
be serious, but nevertheless are expensive for the British tax
payer and are cumulative in their effect in delaying or deferring
the return to normal of the British pound sterling.
Another important factor has been the breaking up, as a re
sult of the peace conference, into various units of such countries as
Austria and parts of Russia and dividing them into smaller nations.
It is a question whether this plan of self-determination for
small peoples is altogether a good thing. As a result of it, some
countries have become economically crippled. One large indus
trial country, Austria, for instance, has been split up into three or
four small units, all of which are feeling their new nationalism.
Their manufactures have become disordered, their finances have
been upset; their position is as yet and will be for some time to
come by no means clear, particularly in regard to the proportion
of the debts of the old countries for which they are to be respon
sible; and their exchanges have fallen so low that trading is al
most impossible.
The Polish mark can be bought now in Chicago for 25 cents
a hundred. You can buy the German mark today, which be
fore the war sold for 24 cents, for $1.25 a hundred. You can
buy the French franc, which before the war was valued at 20 cents,
for 5¾ cents. The Austrian crown you can buy at 30 cents a
hundred; the Italian lira for three cents, and so on down the line.
Mind you, we buy the franc from the Italian and the lira from
the Frenchman, which shows that the opinion they have of one
another’s currency is not by any means flattering.
At present we are in the midst of our export season. Under
normal conditions exchange falls in the autumn. This year it
fell, but it was so low when it began to fall that the price at
which foreign exchanges are selling today on the Chicago market
is something of a tragedy.
Imagine, if you can, the state of mind, to say nothing of the
state of pocketbook; of a German who has to find seventy-five
marks with which to buy one dollar’s worth of cotton, when for
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merly he had to find only four marks. And do not forget that
Germany and Austria were the two countries which before the
war were the largest and perhaps the only consumers on a great
scale of our low-grade cotton. We have a lot of low-grade cot
ton in this country today, and our problem now is to dispose of it.
If we cannot find some means of shipping it to Austria and Ger
many, the price of cotton in this country is going lower instead
of higher.
As I said, however, the export season is at its height, and
Europe is in sore straits for means of paying for what she de
sires to import from us and what we are equally desirous of ex
porting to her, namely, our surplus. Money rates in this country
are unusually high, so that even allowing for the fairly liberal
rates of interest which European banks are paying on deposits,
our own demand for capital in this country is so keen that Amer
ican banks have not been able to carry in Europe the foreign bal
ances which they were in the habit of carrying.
The result is that there is a constant pressure to sell on the
foreign exchange market. I may say further that not only is that
pressure exerted because of the depreciation in foreign money,
but also because of the fear always lurking in the back of every
exchange dealer’s mind that exchange may fall lower.
Foreign exchange before the war did not give us much con
cern, because during that period money rates were easy, business
conditions generally were normal and goods moved freely. If
England owed us something we got gold for it. If France owed
us a balance we called for gold and got it. Per contra, if we
owed England and France, we shipped gold to them. Under these
conditions, therefore, the fluctuations in foreign exchange did not
exceed perhaps
or 2 per cent per annum.
Prior to the war, money rates were fairly easy and foreign
exchange rates were kept within bounds by what were known as
the gold points. In other words, as soon as it became cheaper to
ship or to import gold, gold was shipped or gold was imported,
and that checked the upward or downward movement in the ex
changes. Those days, however, are over.
History is repeating itself. The other night, while sitting at
home, I was reading and refreshing my memory with Green’s
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History of England. Writing of the conditions in England about
1816, immediately after the Napoleonic wars, Green says:
“Peace left the country feverish and much weighed down by
heavy taxation and enormous debts. The markets were glutted
with unsalable goods, and mills and manufactories were brought
to a standstill. Much of the prosperity of English agriculture
was fictitious and rested on the high price of corn brought about
by the war.”
It seems to me that with some little modification, that descrip
tion would almost fit our country today.
The foreign exchanges are, of course, the direct reflectors of
the disordered state of the world’s affairs, and time will be re
quired to restore them.
Until trading and commerce readjust themselves, as they must
and will some day, we may expect great and violent fluctuations.
We have them every week or two, sometimes we have them every
day. We had a bad break this week. Sharp movements take place
most unexpectedly and for reasons that cannot always be discerned
or explained.
I do not want to go into too much detail, but last Saturday,
only six days ago, you could have bought all the sterling ex
change you wanted in Chicago for $3.33 a pound. Yesterday
afternoon you could get $3.51 a pound for the same sterling.
There is an advance of 18 cents. To what it is attributable, nobody
yet knows. The news from abroad is no more favorable than
before. Whether there has been a slowing down of exports tem
porarily or not, I do not know, but these unexpected movements
take place and we find out a week or a month or two months after
they occur what caused them; but at the time of their occurrence
they are often hard to explain. There are so many cross currents
in the foreign exchange market at the present time that it presents
a situation which is exceedingly difficult to grasp. For example,
we may not know it until afterwards, but France may be a seller
of Belgian exchange, while London is selling marks, or vice versa.
Therefore we cannot understand at the time what brings about
these remarkable fluctuations, which occur without any warning.
The changes brought about by the war are only now beginning
to make themselves thoroughly understood to many of us, and
some of them are not and will not be completely understood until
the system of governmental control of commodities and prices
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throughout the world has been completely ended. That situation
is rapidly coming about. The foreign exchanges are now free and
regulating themselves according to the laws of supply and demand.
Over some few other commodities, however, it is understood that
a partial measure of control is yet being exercised.
To go back a little, shortly after the declaration of war, in
August, 1914, most of the foreign exchanges rose rapidly. The
pound sterling, which had a normal quotation or par value of
$4.8666, rose to $7.50. The French franc with a par value of
19.3 cents advanced, if my memory is not at fault, to something
like 23 cents. The German mark, with a par value of 23.8 cents,
advanced to about 27 or 28 cents, and so on throughout the list.
The reason for that was because those countries had been sud
denly plunged into war and they were trying to draw home all
the capital they had abroad, and they were rapidly selling all the
securities of other countries, and American securities in particular,
that they had, and were also selling in the American market any
of the foreign securities they owned which the American market
would or could absorb.
At that time there was a great hue and cry throughout the
country as the result of representations made to us by England
and France, that we ought to ship gold; that the pound was sell
ing at 40 per cent premium in America and no gold was released,
and that gold ought to be forthcoming. Many of the merchants
and business men in this country were indignant with the govern
ment and the bankers because it was thought they were slow in
agreeing to the exportation of gold at that period. But wiser
counsels prevailed. There were better hands at the helm than
some people thought at that time; and as a result of one or two
conferences held in Washington, it was decided to form what was
known as the one-hundred-million-dollar gold pool.
This is all ancient history now, but they did form the onehundred-million-dollar gold pool, and that hundred million in gold
was held in reserve to meet any emergency. The country could
use that gold if necessary; but it was pointed out at the time by
those best qualified to speak that the exchange of any country
engaged in war must sooner or later go to a discount, and conse
quently it would be only a short time before the English, French,
Italian and Belgian exchange would fall to a discount when
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reckoned in terms of the American dollar. Therefore, it was felt
that it would be a great mistake on the part of this country and
a needless expense to ship a large amount of gold abroad to pro
tect the exchange rate when because of these reasons the exchange
rate must necessarily adjust itself within a short time and render
gold exports unnecessary. The wisdom of that course was demon
strated within a few months when the foreign exchanges, which
had been so much against us, began to break and to turn in our
favor.
Nothing of a very decided character took place until August,
1915, about a year after the outbreak of war, when, like a bolt
from the blue, sterling exchange broke from about $4.70 a pound
to about $4.25 a pound. Sterling at $4.25 a pound looked cheap,
although it was difficult to say at that time whether it was really
cheap or merely low. Those who bought around that figure made
money, for shortly afterwards sterling went up. The rise, how
ever, came about because of arrangements which were entered into
shortly after that time between England and the banking firm of
J. P. Morgan & Co. of New York acting as fiscal agents for the
British government in particular and the allies in general in this
country.
As a result of that arrangement Morgan & Co. agreed (the
British government, of course, finding the money for the purpose)
to take up the daily slack in exchange. The practical working of
the arrangement was smooth and satisfactory. Sterling exchange
quickly came back to 4.76 a pound, or about 2 per cent below par,
and was maintained in that neighborhood until November, 1918,
the month of the armistice.
The French franc, which had fallen low, was also brought
back to $5.45, or about 6 per cent discount. The Italian lira was
brought back from a price of about 10 to the dollar to a price of
about 6½ to the dollar, and maintained by the allies artificially
during the whole period of the war.
About the end of November, 1918, however, government con
trol or artificial support of the exchanges was withdrawn without
any warning to the market as a whole. Many people were running
along with a feeling of false security. Others thought, if the
allies were able to maintain exchange at these prices during the
war, that as soon as the war was over many of these exchanges
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would go to par. As a matter of fact, as soon as the drawbar
was pulled out, foreign exchange began to drop.
Perhaps the most remarkable outcome of the war has been the
complete transformation of the United States from a substantial
debtor country into the chief creditor country of the world. In
many respects it is a position that is far from being as comfort
able as that which we occupied when we owed something. As I
said a little while ago, at the outbreak of the war we owed Europe
four billion dollars. We have paid that off, our government has
lent ten billions to the allies for the prosecution of the war, and, in
addition to that, there is overhanging the market a commercial
floating indebtedness of between three billion and four billion dol
lars, so that Europe at the present time is indebted to us to the
extent of about fourteen billion dollars.
While it is true that we have become a creditor nation, it is
also true that we have become a creditor nation more by accident
than by design. How long we may be able to maintain our posi
tion as the world’s chief creditor nation will depend very much
upon our own thrift and upon our own ability.
Prior to the war and for a great many years before the war,
England, France and Germany were the world’s principal cred
itors; but these countries had become creditor nations because of
the thrift and industry of their people and by reason of the fact
that their people were in the habit of investing their savings
abroad.
As the world’s creditor nation, I am afraid we shall have to
revise some of our ideas and try better to realize that our new
position as well as bringing us great wealth and prestige also
brings with it great responsibility and great obligations. For years
our own country was dependent for its upbuilding upon loans ob
tained from Europe. Without the money which we got on what
now seems to have been extremely reasonable terms from the old
world, we would never have been what we are today.
There is little likelihood that Europe can ever pay off what
she owes, except in goods and in services—and we must realize
that. Lately we have heard people who ought to know better,
I believe, asking whether this government or that government is
likely to pay its indebtedness. Governments have rarely paid their
indebtedness in the past, and the holders of their bonds never
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thought of asking for the payment of those bonds. All they were
concerned with was the prompt payment of the interest, and people
generally who were supposed to be well off or rich were envied
by their friends if it was known that they had their fortunes in
vested in government bonds.
Today, however, we find any number of people looking askance
at government bonds and asking if they will be paid. Many of
them will never be paid. On many of them the interest may not
be paid unless we revise our views and realize that we must do
something in the way of commercial credits for the rehabilitation
of Europe. We must give our old world debtors time in which
to pay for the raw materials we would export to them and of
which they are sorely in need. We must give them time to manu
facture these raw materials into the finished product and sell it,
before we demand payment of them.
To maintain American business on an even keel, and to pre
vent as far as possible in this country these alternating periods of
feverish business activity and acute depression, something must be
done to promote and make possible a reasonable continuance of
our foreign trade. To assist in bringing about this condition we
must be prepared to play a generous part in the matter of loans.
We must be prepared to extend credit to deserving buyers of raw
material.
Credits for the sale of our surplus products are in a different
category from credits for the prosecution of a destructive and
disastrous war and should not be regarded as having any relation,
for one is a credit for the purpose of construction and the other
is a credit for the purpose of destruction.
The principal nations of Europe, bear in mind, have actually
more gold on hand today than they had in 1913—not more gold,
by any means, in proportion to their liabilities; not more gold in
proportion to their paper issues; but more gold actually in hand
than they had in 1913. The high premium on the American dollar
in most foreign countries is seriously injuring our export trade.
I have spoken to you chiefly of export trade. Import trade is
as essential to us, to our welfare and to our happiness as the ex
port trade. Everybody in this country, however, when he talks
about foreign trade usually talks and thinks of export trade. Now
it is axiomatic that to buy we must sell, and to sell we must buy.
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The transaction must not be one-sided; it must be mutual.
Europe and South America need us—but we need Europe and
South America. Overproduction is already beginning to make
itself felt here, and if our export trade is seriously cut down,
industrial difficulties must spread in this country.
Last advices from Chili, which we received in the bank the
day before yesterday, quote the American dollar there as having
gone to a 50 per cent premium. In other words, it is now selling
for 7½ pesos against a normal value of 5 pesos. That means if
a merchant in Valparaiso, Chili, today owes a Chicago firm
$100,000, it costs him $150,000 to pay his obligation. It might
ruin many people if they were compelled to remit at this time.
Because of these conditions brought about by the collapse in com
modity prices moratoria in Brazil and the Argentine are a possi
bility. They have already gone into effect in half a dozen other
countries which could not pay under these conditions.
The Brazilian situation is extremely grave because of the con
dition of the coffee and rubber markets. In 1913 crude rubber
sold for $3.50 a pound. Today the producers of crude rubber in
Brazil are having hard work getting 20 cents a pound. While none
of us has noticed any particular decline in the price of coffee at
the corner grocery—and the corner grocer is the last man to know
that the price of coffee has declined—the wholesaler will tell you
that the coffee for which he paid 18 cents a pound is worth only
6 or 7 cents today in New York and perhaps 3½ to 5 cents, ac
cording to the grade, in Santos. As a large part of the Brazilian
exports consists of rubber from Para and coffee from Santos and
Rio, you can readily understand the situation that exists in that
country.
Almost the same situation exists in the Argentine, where the
principal exports are corn and hides. There is almost a complete
suspension in the wool, hide and leather trade. It is almost impos
sible to buy or sell. I have as a client in Chicago a large firm
engaged in the wool business. Let me tell you this instance to
illustrate the peculiar mental attitude or psychology in the wool
trade at present. Wool is quoted here and in Boston, which is the
principal market, as unsalable—and it is unsalable. If you have
any wool you will find that you cannot sell it, because nobody will
make a bid for it. This Chicago client, however, conceived the
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idea of buying some cheap wool. He had read that the Montana
sheep-growers and clippers had had a splendid clip this year.
Therefore he came to see me about a month ago with two of his
buyers and I equipped him with a letter of credit for $100,000 and
sent them off to Montana to buy wool. These men spent thirty
days in Montana; they offered good American gold dollars to
every farmer they met, but they could not buy a pound of wool.
They would ask the farmer why, and the farmer would reply:
“You don’t offer enough.” My client said that his answer to that
was: “What is this wool quoted at in Boston today?” Now Bos
ton, as I told you a moment ago, is the only real wool market in
this country. The farmer would say, “Six cents.” “Well, I will
give you eight cents a pound in Montana for your wool.” The
buyer and seller could not get together. There was a practical
impasse, a suspension in the wool trade. Prices have declined so
low that the sellers think if they sell now they are giving the
commodity away; and while some of the buyers would buy, many
of them are afraid the price will go even lower.
The situation in South America has lately grown very acute.
Last spring a loan of $50,000,000, which had been made to the
Argentine government, fell due in New York.
The Argentine
government wanted to renew the loan, but the American bankers
thought they wanted to have their money back again. The result
was that the Argentine government paid off the United States, but
in order to pay us they went to London and borrowed the money
there. Our attitude which compelled them to do that was, in my
opinion, short sighted. Fifty million dollars, considering the fig
ures in which we have been dealing for the last year or two, is a
mere bagatelle for the United States, but it is a considerable sum
for the Argentine.
We have been working hard in this country—or at least we
want it thought that we have been working hard—to wean Cen
tral and South America from trading and banking with Europe.
A transaction of this kind is not the way to do it. By it we are
helping to throw South America back into European hands, and
today, notwithstanding the condition of the European money mar
kets as a whole, South America can get a longer and better credit
there than she can get in the United States.
Our crops, nature having been kind and bountiful to us this
year, are too big for home consumption. Europe is still hungry.
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Our low-grade cotton is literally overflowing the warehouses of
the south. It largely exceeds our home demand, while the spindles
of many European countries are idle for lack of it.
Experience seems to teach that most men throughout the world
are honest. In the past Europe thought American business men
were honest, otherwise Europeans would not have lent as freely
as they did for the development of this country. America would
not be what it is today had it not been for our ability to borrow
in the old world. They trusted us in those hard-up days of ours,
and we must trust them not only for their sakes but for our own.
This is our problem, if we ever expect to get payment of the in
terest on the money which Europe already owes us. This is our
problem if we value our own financial and social security. This is
our problem if we would keep our own factories going and our
own labor busy. An idle, unfed and discontented Europe is a
menace to the security of the United States.
There are one or two figures which I want to read to you that
are interesting and have some bearing on what I have just been
saying. I believe they are fairly accurate.
It may not be generally known that with only six per cent of
the world’s population and only seven per cent of the land surface
of the world the United States produces:

20 per cent of the world’s gold.
25 per cent of the world’s wheat.
40 per cent of the world’s iron and steel.
40 per cent of the world’s lead.
40 per cent of the world’s silver.
50 per cent of the world’s zinc.
52 per cent of the world’s coal.
60 per cent of the world’s aluminum.
60 per cent of the world’s copper.
60 per cent of the world’s cotton.
66 per cent of the world’s oil.
75 per cent of the world’s com.
85 per cent of the world’s automobiles.
In addition we also refine 80 per cent of the copper and operate
40 per cent of the railroad trackage of the world.
Believing these figures to be substantially correct, can we ex
pect to get on without an international market ? It is impossible.
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The domestic demand for funds continues strong, and the need for
extending help to Europe and to South America is pressing. How
ever, it is generally true that money is forthcoming at some sort
of a rate, and the time has apparently come when rates that a few
years ago would have seemed very high may no longer be re

garded so.
It is well to remember that money, while high, is only relatively
so. Money as a commodity, during a period when other commodi
ties soared in price, advanced little in its cost to the consumer.
The prices of most other commodities have advanced from too
per cent to 350 per cent, but money costs have increased on an
average of only 25 per cent—and that in the face of a great in
crease in the cost of rendering banking service. The increase in
the interest rates to the borrower has been less than the increase
in the cost of any other element entering into production or dis
tribution.
Foreign trade and foreign exchange, which go hand in hand,
require immediate help. The situation is bad, but not to my mind
hopeless. It will work out in time. We have all got to go on
working and living and working for a living; but things will work
out much sooner and much better if not allowed to drift entirely
by themselves.
Some means must be found, and should be found speedily, for
funding into a long term loan the ten billion dollars which the
allied countries owe to our government. All of you have no doubt
read from time to time suggestions in the newspapers and else
where to the effect that we should remit that debt or cancel it. In
other words, that we should call it off. I am not at all sure that that
would be the right thing to do. As a matter of fact, I dissent from
that opinion. I know from talking with the leading bankers of
Great Britain that they would not listen for a moment to any can
cellation. The French have not declared themselves positively on
the subject, but I do not believe they can afford to consent to it,
and I believe the same thing is probably true of the Italians and
the Belgians. There is a vast difference between compromising
or canceling a country’s internal debts and failing promptly and
properly to deal with a country’s external debts. What England,
France, Belgium or any other foreign country may eventually do
with its own internal debts is an absolutely different question from
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that involved in this ten billion dollar loan. They may compromise
with their own people, or they may even go to the extent of repu
diation ; but to do anything that would suggest repudiation or un
willingness to pay their external debts would blacklist them for all
time in other countries.
If the weight of that ten billion dollar debt could be taken off
the foreign exchange market; and if in addition to that some means
could be found—and I think the means could be found easily
among the banking and commercial interests of this country—for
the funding into a five-year loan, let us say, of the floating debt of
three or four billion dollars, so that these two debts which hang
over the foreign exchange situation could be taken out of the way,
I believe that within less than one year we would be back to some
thing approaching normal conditions.
There is no short cut from the financial and economic troubles
with which the world is today beset. Bankers, lawyers, doctors,
economists and business men have been looking for some cure,
some panacea for the financial ills which have surrounded us for
the last year. There is nothing, however, but the old-fashioned
way out—namely, hard work. In other words, the cure is not to
be found in this nostrum nor in that, but only in the gradual and
probably painful convalescence of the entire world through hard
work, industry, thrift.
A return to normal conditions need not be expected for some
time. There are too many reasons why the world cannot get back
at once to normal.
Russia, for example, a great wheat-producing and consuming
country, is not functioning at present. It has vanished from among
us as though it had never been, and its place as a consumer and
producer may not be filled for many a day to come. Russia will
recover in time. Bolshevism will wear itself out, for it is in prin
ciple economically unsound.
Germany, one of the greatest industrial countries in the world,
and a large consumer of Brazil’s rubber and coffee, of America’s
cotton and grain, is temporarily out of the market, and it will be
some time before she is able to resume her place.
There seems to my mind little doubt that Germany is emerging
from the state of financial and economic chaos in which the end of
the war found her. The Germans are a resourceful people. The
one great mistake they made was in bringing on the late war. They
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were conquering the world by peaceful penetration but they
threw away their chances when they engaged in the world war.
Commercially their country was growing more rapidly than any
other. The Germans have a natural genius for developing new
fields. Before the war commercial Russia was German Russia.
So thoroughly had the German business man penetrated into that
country that nine-tenths of Russian industries were directly under
German control. The two countries, Germany and Russia, lie
side by side, and it is natural in view of all that has gone before
that they should trade together again in the future as the United
States and Canada, being close neighbors, trade together today.
None of us can say what will happen in the future—prophecy
is always a dangerous thing—but it need not surprise any of us if
within a few years Germany again gains control of commercial
Russia. This, of course, is what France fears; but it is open to
question whether the world has not more to fear from a Russia
and a Germany in their present condition than it would have to
fear from a Germanized Russia, prosperous, industrious and con
tented.
The German people have to overflow somewhere, and the
logical outlet for them is into Russia. Before the war Germany
was England’s greatest customer and England was Germany’s
greatest customer. Until trade relations are re-established on
something approaching a normal scale between these two great
countries, the world’s trade will continue to be dislocated.
England, the country whose affairs today are perhaps more
nearly normal than the affairs of any other country, barring our
own, is suffering acutely from many of the disabilities from which
we suffer, including an acute lack of working capital. Eng
land is not at present able to discharge her former function as the
world’s principal banker. No longer can we or other foreign coun
tries repair to the London market for cheap loans, for the British
government itself is borrowing on a six per cent basis, and the
English banks are paying five to five and one-half per cent on for
eign deposits.
The prosperity of England, which is an industrial country, de
pends upon her ability to produce and manufacture more cheaply
than can the countries to which she sells. England’s prosperity
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therefore hinges almost completely upon her ability to keep down
the cost of production.
Many countries throughout the world are facing changes and
far-reaching readjustments in their economic and financial life,
and my opinion is that depression and perhaps hard times, not only
in Europe but in this country, are not very far away. Deflation is
under way and deflation is always painful.
Customs tariffs will no doubt be revised both here and abroad.
At any rate, they will be up for serious consideration and discus
sion, and the problem before the American people will be to de
cide whether we should permit foreign goods to come in as they
have been coming in, and in that way enable the impoverished
countries of Europe in some measure to offset their obligations to
us, or we should go further and by reducing our tariffs on certain
imported articles thereby stimulate the flow of European mer
chandise to this country.
The war, fortunately, is over—although some of our rulers at
Washington do not as yet seem to be aware of it. Deflation and
contraction have set in. The dollar will buy a bigger loaf of bread
and get a better day’s work done in the future than it has in the
past. The time has come when the fiddler must be paid and there
is only one way in which we can pay. That is by practising strict
economy, working hard and saving our money.
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